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THE EVOLVING CHINESE ENTERPRISE 
James V. Feinerman* 
Despite much discussion of economic reform in the People's 
Republic of China and of the "expanded autonomy" which is being 
given to factory managers in order to improve China's economic 
performance, 1 little attention has been focused on the legal 
changes which have accompanied these phenomena over the past 
decade. If, indeed, Chinese enterprises are becoming the equivalent 
of Western corporations, then what does Chinese corporate law 
look like? Are there corresponding legal enactments which support 
the historic decentralization of China's industrial production and 
embrace of market mechanisms?2 
Briefly, the answer is, "Yes, there are Chinese laws which em-
body many of these changes." Recent legislation3 detailing the 
newest powers of Chinese enterprises and factory managers is, in 
fact, merely the latest lawmaking in an area which has seen prodig-
ious activity since 1978. Given the collectivist and state-centered 
nature of the Chinese economy from 1949 until the death of Chair-
man Mao, it would have been very unlikely that much change 
could have occurred without some legislative protection. Chinese 
managers are not prone to radical change, especially of a sort 
which was - in historical context - politically suspect. In addition 
to the assurances of the state leadership that, in the post-Mao era, 
it was now "glorious" to get rich;' these veterans of many earlier 
"reforms" and campaigns were not about to alter their longstand-
ing business practices and institutional relationships without some 
sort of protection. A growing body of enterprise law passed over 
the last ten years has so provided. 6 
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Portions of this article have 
also appeared in E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 9 (June, 1988). 
1. See, e.g., Wong, The Second Phase of Economic Reform in China, CURRENT HIS-
TORY, Sept. 1985, at 260. See also THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA 
(E. Perry and C. Wong, eds. 1985). 
2. Lichtenstein, Law and the Enterprise, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 38. 
3. Law Concerning Enterprises Owned by the Whole People of the People's Republic of 
China (adopted Apr. 13, 1988) (effective Aug. l, 1988) (promulgated by the First Session of 
the Seventh National People's Congress) ("State Enterprise Law"). 
4. 0. SCHELL, To GET RICH IS GLORIOUS: CHINA IN THE EIGHTIES (1984) (detailing eco-
nomic reforms since the late 1970s and their effects on the Chinese populace; the phrase in 
the title is attributed to China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping). 
5. See Selected Laws Governing Enterprise Establishment and Operation, CHINA Bus. 
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 40. (Listing 22 laws in the following categories: Enterprise Registra-
tion, Enterprise Operation, Economic Contracts, and Specific Types of Contracts). 
1
Feinerman: The  Evolving Chinese Enterprise
Published by SURFACE, 1989
204 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 15:203 
Yet, it may still be too soon to hail the conversion of the Chi-
nese to capitalist modes of economic activity. The present Chinese 
enterprise, even under the new legal regime, is still far from the 
modern corporation known to the developed world. With the vast 
bulk of China's economy still largely under state control, it may be 
premature to talk of Chinese "corporations." On the other hand, 
the problems which are now emerging from the reform process in 
the operation of Chinese enterprises may suggest both new areas of 
concern for the economists and legislative needs for the political 
leadership. The difficulties which have thus far impeded the mo-
mentous changes center on three areas: ownership, control, and or-
ganization. This article will first attempt to analyze the stages of 
economic and legal reform which have resulted in the present state 
of the Chinese enterprise and then suggest the prospects for future 
development in the light of recent legislation. 
Ownership of socialist enterprises has long been legally prob-
lematic in the People's Republic of China (PRC). According to 
both socialist theory and constitutional pronouncement, 6 only the 
state or collective entities can carry out large-scale economic activi-
ties. Since the early 1950s, theory and economic reality have been 
congruent, due to the elimination of any significant private owner-
ship of the means of production. Even with the economic reforms 
of the last decade, there has been little erosion of these two basic 
forms of ownership.7 With no individual owners to demand an ac-
counting of economic performance, however, the pattern had 
emerged of state or collective subsidization of enterprises (coupled, 
of course, in rare instances with their ability to take all the profits 
of those enterprises which earned any). Partly to discourage con-
tinuation of this practice and partly to draw upon additional 
sources of investment for growth, the PRC government has experi-
mented lately with new forms of ownership such as bondholding 
and shareholding, encouraging individuals and groups to purchase 
ownership interests in large enterprises. One of the results of this 
process, it has been hoped, would be closer monitoring of the indi-
6. 1982 CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 6, col. 1: 
The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist 
public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and 
collective ownership by the working people. 
7. See, e.g., 1982 CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 7 (state economy 
under the ownership of the whole people is "the leading force in the national economy") and 
art. 7, cl. 1 (the individual economy is "a complement to the socialist public economy"). 
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cia of economic performance by interested investors.8 It should be 
noted, however, that such investment has never been intended to 
reach a level of majority ownership and that the state and collec-
tive remain in control of virtually every sizable enterprise in China. 
Thus, significant changes within the Chinese enterprise may await 
meaningful alteration of ownership relations in the larger economy. 
Similarly, the new attention to enterprise management and 
greater autonomy for individual enterprise managers and factory 
directors has yet to be supplemented by realistic measures which 
might insure independent decision-making. In both financing and 
operating large-scale enterprises in the PRC today, Chinese man-
agers lack real control. The planned sector of the economy remains 
predominant, while market needs are only grudgingly recognized. 
Allocation of necessary inputs for production, prices for finished 
goods, transport and communication facilities are all beyond the 
manager's ability to control. Access to capital, particularly to 
scarce foreign exchange if needed, is restricted by both an anti-
quated banking system and by a labyrinthine process of exchange 
control. In the worst cases, Chinese managers are exhorted to make 
profits - with the threat of bankruptcy looming for poqr performers 
- at the same time their hands are tied with respect to adjusting 
their operations so as to fulfill this new mandate. 
The ever-present yardstick by which reforms in the industrial 
enterprise sector are measured is the success of agricultural reform 
in the Chinese countryside, where roughly 85 % of the Chinese 
population lives. The landmark policy change announced in Octo-
ber, 19849 remains the watershed event of recent Chinese economic 
history. By entrenching the reformist policies of de-collectivizing 
agriculture, encouraging production outside the State plan and al-
lowing considerable latitude in pricing, hiring help and even alloca-
tion of state-controlled resources, this decision of the central gov-
ernment convinced China's agricultural workforce that the changes 
in economic regulation of that sector were permanent.10 Such a re-
versal in, or reconciliation of, the relationship between the 
8. Regulations of the State Council Concerning the Balance of Foreign Exchange In-
come and Expenditure by Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Ventures (promulgated Jan. 15, 1986). 
The Chinese text and an English translation appear in 1 CHINA L. FOREIGN Bus. 385 (1987). 
See also Note, Chinese Solutions to Legal Problems: Repartraiting Business Profits from 
the People's Republic of China, 19 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 385 (1987). 
9. Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of 
the Economic Structure, reprinted in 27 BEIJING REV., at I-XVI (1984). 
10. Wong, supra note l, at 260 (" ... dramatic successes were achieved in the rural 
sector"). 
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mandatory plan and the guidance mechanisms promoting markets 
has not yet occurred in the industrial sphere. 
No examination of the reforms now being proposed for the 
regulation of Chinese enterprises can ignore the existence of a 
number of enemies of change which retain considerable power in 
Chinese society. The reduction of the role of the State plan, the 
acknowledgment of new forms of ownership and the accumulation 
of funds for separate use by individual enterprises all threaten sys-
tems of belief and powerful institution, including Marxism-Lenin-
ism-Mao Zedong Thought,11 the Communist Party of China and 
the People's Bank of China. Individual workers and their families 
are also made uncomfortable by the prospect of significant change 
in economic organization which may threaten their current equilib-
rium. Accustomed to low, stable prices and egalitarian income dis-
tribution, they are also fearful of what price decontrol and per-
formance-based policies may portend. 12 Finally, deficiencies in 
Chinese economic infrastructure such as the lack of accounting 
standards, the failure to distinguish "firms" (individual enter-
prises) from their supervising ministries, excessive localism and 
poor transportation and communications facilities may thwart at-
tempts to reform the industrial economy.13 
The legal status of enterprises which is addressed by the new 
enactments discussed below may mark a departure from the post-
1949 reluctance of central government ministries to provide lower-
level entities with meaningful independence. Gradually, autonomy 
could be achieved by allowing enterprises to have some control 
over their own funds, to make independent decisions about pro-
duction and marketing and to develop or to purchase needed tech-
nology. 14 The crucial underpinning of these powers can now be 
found in the provisions of the General Principles of Civil Law, in 
force since only 1986.16 By giving the sanction of law to the "legal 
person,"16 these principles enable enterprises to claim the law's im-
11. L. Sullivan, Assault on the Reforms: Conservative Criticism of Political and Eco-
nomic Liberalization in China, 1985-86, 114 CHINA Q. 198 (1987). 
12. Luo, China's Economic Reforms Face Major Constraints, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Jan. 
2-8, 1988, at 72. 
13. Liu, A Sweet and Sour Decade, BEIJING REV., Jan. 2-8, 1989, at 22. (Review of ten 
years of economic reform). 
14. Burki, Reform and Growth in China, FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1988, at 46. 
15. General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the 
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, Apr. 12, 1986 [hereinafter General 
Principles of Civil Law], translated in 34 AM. J . COMP. L. 715 (1986). 
16. Id. arts. 36-50; translated in 34 AM. J. COMP L. at 722-725 (1986). 
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primatur both for their individual status and for their activities as 
entities separate from their higher-level ministries. The new State 
Enterprise Law fleshes out the bare bones of the generalities cre-
ated by the Civil Law with respect to the powers of the state in-
dustrial enterprises. 
THE STATE ENTERPRISE LAW 
The new Chinese "Law Concerning Enterprises Owned by the 
Whole of the People of the People's Republic of China" ("State 
Enterprise Law"), passed by the First Session of the Seventh Na-
tional People's Congress in April, 1988, is a major shift in the 
course of China's legal and economic reform. As a key element in 
PRC's attempt to open its economy to market forces, the State En-
terprise Law should help to clarify the vague legal status of Chi-
nese state-owned enterprises and enhance the prospects for grant-
ing considerable independent decision-making power to these 
enterprises. Making factory managers responsible for the strategic 
planning and for profits and losses will finally be feasible. Previous 
uncertainties made factory managers cautious about economic re-
form. It should be noted, however, that the new law does not yet 
provide China with a complete company law or corporate code -
only state-owned enterprises are covered. Numerous "companies" 
and "corporations" have been organized in the PRC over the past 
several years, but their legal status remains indeterminate.17 
The 69-article law, divided into eight chapters, resolves a long-
running debate between the Communist Party reformers and con-
servatives and removes factory management from the day-to-day 
oversight of Communist Party officials. 18 The law also paved the 
way for the implementation, three months after the effective date 
of August 1, 1988, of the PRC's much-touted Bankruptcy Law.19 
The Bankruptcy Law's final implementation had been made con-
17. Sensenbrenner, The Evolving Enterprise, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 36. 
(In 1985, there were 367,800 collective enterprises and more than 11.6 million private enter-
prises in China). 
18. Yoshida, In Search of a Future - From the 13th Congress of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party to the 7th National People's Congress, 75 CHINA NEWSL., 1988, at 2. 
19. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted on 
Dec. 2, 1986 by the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's 
Congress) (promulgated Dec. 2, 1986) (effective Nov. 1, 1988) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Law] 
translated in 19 VAND. J . TRANSNAT'L L. 733 (1986). See also Zheng, Bankruptcy Law of the 
People's Republic of China: Principle, Procedure & Practice, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT1L L. 683 
(1986). 
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tingent upon the adoption of the State Enterprise Law.20 
Debate over the new State Enterprise Law continued for al-
most nine years, beginning in 1979 with the passage of the PRC's 
first new laws. Questions about the rights and obligations of state-
owned enterprises, the responsibility of factory directors who ran 
those enterprises, and workers and their relationship with the state 
government and the Communist Party had all proved to be contro-
versial.21 The contradictions between state planning and market 
forces, Party secretaries and factory managers as well as managers 
and workers, exacerbated the difficulty in agreeing upon a final 
law. Several times in the mid-1980's the law was reported to be 
ready for passage, only to be withheld at the last minute for fur-
ther 6mendation. 22 
The State Enterprise Law, adopted on April 3, 1988, closely 
followed the draft law published January 9, 1988 and another in-
terim draft of March 3, 1988; a few significant differences between 
the final law and these drafts will be noted below. The first chap-
ter, enunciating general provisions, clarifies the scope of the law's 
application, and limits it to state-owned industrial enterprises. 23 
Article 2 also makes clear that state enterprises are legal persons 
under Chinese civil law, with the same status and ability to under-
take obligations as all legal persons. 24 Article 4 and 5 contain the 
compulsory assurances that such enterprises must promote social-
ism and socialist ideals, followed by an equally hortatory Article 6 
which urges enterprises to "realize the multiplication of its assets." 
Article 7 makes clear that the factory director bears responsibility 
for the enterprise's management; the Communist Party's role as 
guarantor and implementor of Party principles in the enterprise is 
stated in Article 8. 25 Articles 9-11 lay out the labor management 
20. Bankruptcy Law, art. 43: "This law will be implemented on a trial basis three 
months after the Law of the Enterprises under the Ownership of the Whole People takes 
effect .... " 
21. Sullivan, supra note 11. 
22. Chao & Yang, Private Enterprise in China: The Developing Law of Collective En-
terprises, 19 INT'L LAW. 1215 (1986). Lichtenstein, Legal Implications of China's Economic 
Reforms, 1 Icsm REV. 289 (1987). 
49. 
23. State Enterprise Law, arts. 1-2. 
24. General Principles of Civil Law, ch. 3, §2, "Enterprises as Legal Persons", arts. 41-
25. State Enterprise Law, art. 8: 
The basic organization of the Communist Party of China in an enterprise en-
sures and oversees the implementation of general and specific policies of the party 
and state in that enterprise. It supports the director in discharging his authority 
according to the law. 
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principles of the law, ensuring protection of the workers' "lawful 
rights and interests" and democratic management by means of 
workers' congresses and trade unions.26 Articles 14 and 15 contain 
important statements which respectively protect the property 
given to enterprises to manage and which ensure the "lawful rights 
and interests" of enterprises. 
In describing the establishment of enterprises, Chapter Two 
states that enterprises must comply with relevant rules of the 
State Council and must register with the appropriate administra-
tive authorities for industry and commerce.27 Thus, a formal li-
censing system for control of enterprises should be strengthened. 
Article 17 contains a long list of requirements which must be met 
before an enterprise can be established: 
- the enterprise's products must be "needed," 
- the enterprise must have its own premises and name, 
- the enterprise should have separate access to raw materials 
and energy, as well as state funds, and 
- the enterprise should have its own organizational structure, 
etc.28 
The merger of the enterprises is anticipated, subject to gov-
ernment approval.29 Most importantly, new provisions have been 
made for termination of enterprises which will certainly be impor-
tant in implementing the Bankruptcy Law. Article 19, which envi-
sions termination for four categories of reasons, including violation 
of the law and decision of government authorities responsible for 
the enterprise, also lists bankruptcy as a reason for the termination 
of an enterprise.30 Liquidation according to law is called for,31 and 
changes in enterprise status must be approved by and registered 
with the proper authorities for industry and commerce. 32 
The most important chapter of the new law, Chapter Three, 
26. See also Work Regulations for Grass-Roots Organizations of the Communist Party 
of China in State-Owned Industrial Enterprises (effective Oct. 1986) translated in Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report: China, Feb. 4, 1987, at K26. 
27. State Enterprise Law, art. 16. 
28. See also Provisional Regulations on Registration and Control of Companies (ap-
proved by the State Council, Aug. 14, 1985) (issued by the State Administration for Indus-
try and Commerce, Aug. 25, 1985) reported in FBIS Daily Report: China, Aug. 27, 1985 as 
"Corporation Registration Regulations Promulgated" [hereinafter Companies Registration 
Regulations]. 
29. State Enterprise Law, art. 18. 
30. Id. art. 19(3). 
31. Id. art. 20. Presumably, this refers to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law, dis-
cussed supra note 19. 
32. Id. art. 21. 
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sets forth the rights and obligations of the enterprise. It promises 
an enterprise the right to arrange its production;33 the right to re-
quest adjustment of the mandatory plan and to reject additional 
assignments outside the mandatory plan;3" the right to sell on its 
own, outside the mandatory plan quotas;35 the right to choose sup-
pliers as it chooses;86 and the right to set its own prices, except for 
those under price controls set by the State Council. 37 Other rights 
guaranteed to enterprises under the new State Enterprise Law in-
clude: freedom to deal with foreign parties and to sign contracts 
with them, subject to State Council provisions, 38 budgetary control 
over retained funds (retained earnings),39 control over fixed assets 
and their disposal,"0 power to fix wages and bonuses,41 and the 
power to hire, fire and redeploy personnel. 42 
One significant addition to enterprise autonomy is the promise 
of Article 33 that enterprises can "reject the exaction of manpower, 
materials and financial resources" by any state organ or unit. Arti-
cle 34 also provides limited rights to engage in joint operations, 
rights which are also envisioned in the General Principles of Civil 
Law, as well as the right to issue bonds (but not in equity shares) 
in accordance with State Council provisions promulgated in 1987."3 
As quid pro quo for these rights, Chinese enterprises are ex-
pected to fulfill corresponding obligations. They must meet 
mandatory plan quotas and perform lawful economic contracts."" 
They must also observe applicable state economic regulations,"6 
33. Id. art. 22 ("Guided by the state plans," of course). 
34. Id. art 23 (but only "for goods whose planned supply and marketing are 
nonessential"). 
35. Id. art. 24. 
36. Id. art 25; An enterprise has the right to chose the suppliers of goods and buy the 
supplies its production needs from those suppliers. Perhaps the sweeping permission of this 
article is rooted in the fact that supplies of any important enterprises are already guaran-
teed by the state plan. 
37. Id. art. 26. 
38. Id. art. 27. 
39. Id. art. 28. 
40. Id. art. 29. 
41. Id. art. 30 ("in a manner it considers appropriate"). 
42. Id. arts. 30 and 32. 
43. As to joint operations, see General Principles of Civil Law, Ch. 3, §4 ("Joint Opera-
tions"), arts. 51-53. 
The State Council's bond regulations are the Provisional Regulations on the Adminis-
tration of Enterprise Bonds, promulgated by the State Council in April, 1987. 
44. State Enterprise Law, art. 35. 
45. Id. art. 37. 
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guarantee product and service quality,46 and observe state stan-
dards of industrial safety and environmental protection.47 China's 
state enterprises are also urged to economize,48 to strengthen "se-
curity work" and to protect state property.49 Further, they are 
urged to maintain and renew their fixed assets, 60 by reinvesting re-
tained earnings in a productive capacity. 
Two parallel chapters, Chapters Four and Five, outline the 
roles of factory directors and of staff and workers in state enter-
prises under the new law. Chapter Four states that factory direc-
tors may be appointed by the government or elected by the work-
ers. 61 The factory director is made the legal representative of the 
enterprise. 62 The director has the power to decide on the enterprise 
plan, the administrative setup of the enterprise, the middle-level 
administrative personnel, as well as the power to reward or punish 
the staff or workers. The director is expected to be able to estab-
lish collaborative relations with his sta~3 and to consult with a 
management committee comprised of both managers and workers 
about any "important issues,"64 such as long-term policy, major 
changes in rules and regulations, and reductions in staff. Presuma-
bly, these would include changes in workers' pay. 
Staff and workers, under Chapter Five, are promised the right 
to participate in the enterprise's "democratic management,"66 but 
they are also encouraged to observe labor discipline and fulfill their 
assigned production tasks.66 Staff and workers' congresses are 
urged, through their trade unions, to work with the factory man-
ager.67 Specific powers are provided for in Article 52: 
46. Id. art. 38. 
47. Id. art. 41. 
48. Id. art. 39 ("conserve energy and raw semi-finished materials and shall strive to 
reduce production costs"). 
49. Id. art. 40. 
50. Id. art. 36. 
51. Id. art. 44. A factory director who is hired or elected by the enterprise's workers 
must be approved by the authorized government department in charge of the enterprise. 
52. Id. art. 45. 
53. Id. art. 46. 
54. Id. art. 47. 
55. Id. art. 49. 
56. Id. art. 50. 
57. Id. art. 51. See also Regulations Governing the Work Factory Directors of State-
Owned Industrial Enterprises, (published Sept. 1, 1986) (effective Oct. 1, 1986) reported 
and translated in FBIS Daily Report: China, Feb. 5, 1987, at K19; Work Regulations for 
Grass-Roots Organizations of the Communist Party of China in State-Owned Industrial En-
terprises, published Sept. 15, 1986, effective Oct. 1, 1986, reported and translated in FBIS 
Daily Report: China, Feb. 4, 1987, at K26. 
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- to deliberate on and to forward suggestions for the long-term 
policy set by the director; 
- to examine and to accept or to reject wage adjustments, bo-
nus proposals and other regulatory changes; 
- to decide on programs for staff welfare; 
- to "supervise" administrative cadres of the enterprise; and, 
- where so provided, to elect factory directors. 
The staff and workers' congress is supposed to support the 
factory director and to educate the staff in fulfilling their obliga-
tions. 58 Cooperation is the clear goal. 
Chapter Six clarifies the relationship between the enterprises 
and the government. Under the state plan, the government is to 
provide enterprises what they need to fulfill their quotas. 59 This 
includes advising enterprises in their organization, protecting them 
from infringement by competing enterprises,60 and avoiding state 
encroachment on enterprise rights. 61 Local governments and their 
departments are likewise enjoined to facilitate the work of the 
enterprises. 62 
Chapter Seven, Legal Liability, prohibits the unregistered op-
eration of a state enterprise, fraud on the registration authorities 
or concealment of the truth, and specifies punishment ranging 
from a warning or fine, to revocation of the business license. 63 The 
sale of "substandard" products may result in liability for damages 
and possible criminal charges. 6" This chapter also provides for an 
appeals process against government officials who violate enterprise 
prerogativesn and for administrative and/or criminal punishment 
of enterprise leaders who violate the rights of staff and workers.66 
Administrative and/or criminal penalties may also be assessed 
against enterprise leaders whose negligent performance causes 
"relatively heavy" losses to the enterprise and the state67 and those 
58. State Enterprise Law, art. 54. 
59. Id. art. 55. 
60. Id. art. 56. 
61. Id. art. 58. 
62. Id. art. 57. 
63. Id. art. 59 (referencing the registration requirements of this law, art. 16). 
64. Id. art. 60. 
65. Id. art. 61. 
66. Id. art. 62 (referencing China's Criminal Law, art. 146, which provides for a maxi-
mum punishment of up to seven year's imprisonment for state personnel who neglect their 
duty causing such losses). 
67. Id. art. 63 (referencing China's Criminal Law, art. 187, which provides a maximum 
punishment of up to five years imprisonment for state personnel who neglect their duty 
causing such losses) . 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1989], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol15/iss2/4
1989] Chinese Enterprise 213 
who interfere with the operation of Chinese state enterprises. 68 
Article 67, one of the supplementary provisions in Chapter 
Eight, promises that the State Council shall formulate rules for im-
plementation of the State Enterprise Law. If past practice is any 
guide, these implementing provisions may not appear for some 
time. For example, implementing rules for the 1979 Joint Venture 
Law did not appear until 1983. To heighten the State Enterprise 
Law's mandatory force, the provisions of the Criminal Law re-
ferred to in Article 62-64 are appended to the text of the State 
Enterprise Law.69 
Eventually, the provisions of the law and the implementing 
regulations may provide some solace for foreign investors in China 
concerned with the status of entities with which they contract. 
Past uncertainties will be somewhat alleviated, at least when the 
contracting party to a foreign investment contract is a state enter-
prise. Other questions remain, however, because the law does not 
provide the mechanisms expected of a "corporation" law-proce-
dures for establishment, capital structure and voting share require-
ments, process for authorizing company activities, and so forth. 
Such rules should be included either in another new law or in re-
vised registration regulations for enterprises. 70 
A few issues which proved contentious in the drafting process 
may surface again in the implementation of the State Enterprise 
Law. For example, limits on the authority of the enterprise direc-
tor, which workers' representatives have insisted be included in the 
final version of the law, may undermine the control which the di-
rector was meant to exercise.71 The consultative decision-making 
procedure suggested by the text of the law may prove cumbersome. 
In any case, the language is vague and may raise sticky issues of 
interpretation. Similarly, in toning down the injunction that Party 
officials must remove themselves from the management of enter-
prises, the final law may not make clear just what role the Party 
continues to play. How "supervision" differs from "centralized 
leadership" will have to be determined in practice and may well 
68. Id. art. 64. 
69. In the draft version of Jan. 9, 1988, the criminal law provisions were not appended 
but merely were referred to in the text of the enterprise law. 
70. Companies Registration Regulations, supra note 28. 
71. See, e.g., Fujimoto, Progress in China's Enterprise Reform, 68 CHINA NEWSL., 1987 
at 2 (recounting results of a survey of 300 factory managers concerning their difficulties with 
enterprise self-management). 
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turn out to be changed in nomenclature only. 72 
The role of labor, particularly trade unions, in the implemen-
tation of the new law may prove crucial. If workers decide that 
their fate is now tied to the profits and losses of an enterprise, they 
may (as the drafters intended) act to increase the dynamism of 
Chinese state enterprises and improve their economic returns. Re-
sistance to change is now on the rise, however, and many Chinese 
workers are fearful of the end of the "iron rice bowl" that state 
employment has guaranteed for over thirty years. 73 Whether the 
provisions of the State Enterprises Law will foster new creativity 
or engender a labor-management standoff will only be discerned 
from experience. 
Nevertheless, if China is to take the great strides it hopes to 
achieve in economic reform, this new law is a necessary step. The 
gaps in the law suggest the need for amendment or supplementa-
tion, but the law's overall spirit is consistent with economic pro-
gress. Future areas for legislative action include economic organiza-
tion, including competition regulation, corporate forms (stock 
company, partnership and domestic joint venture laws), and rules 
for individual enterprises. The economic and political situation in 
China is clearly evolving rapidly, but the process of change can 
only be assisted by clearer and more detailed rules. The diversity 
of economic actors encouraged by previous laws, particularly with 
respect to foreign investment, now needs to be paralleled · in the 
domestic economy. The new legislation and related economic re-
forms, however, are promising first steps. 
72. China's Communist Party leadership has been notably loath to surrender any of its 
prerogatives. 
73. This sensitivity is further exacerbated by the new threat of enterprise bankruptcy; 
see e.g., Chang, The East is in the Red, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 42. Unemploy-
ment insurance and other similar benefits are either limited or unavailable for most Chinese 
workers. 
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